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PREFACE

No other word brings panic into the minds of investors so much as
the word bankruptcy..

It conjures images of investors seeing their

stocks become worthless while they stand at the end of a long line of
creditors, bond holders, and other stockholders, certain to get nothing
of their invesbnent back.

While there is no doubt that this is the fate

for many who hold onto the stock of a dying firm, it is certain that
even in this dire situation opportunities for profit can present
thanselves.

Knowing what options the stockholder has before and even

during a bankruptcy is the responsibility of the investor himself.
Unfortunately the rules of bankruptcy, and even the people's attitudes
toward these rules, are in constant flux.

No other area of business law

has been subject to so much change as , the bankruptcy laws in this
country have been during the last decade.

It is true that this constant

revision of laws has created confusion about the procedures of
bankruptcy, and what position this leaves the investor in.

In addition,

the stigma of bankruptcy is sti 11 strong despite changes in the laws
making it possible for a firm to salvage its operations and recover into
a more successful organization.

This stigma causes people to believe a

company is unrecoverable and therefore its assets are essentially
worthless to investors.

This is not always the case; and this ignorance
vii

is where knowledgeable investors have found opportunities.

The

combination of these factors has made investors seriously undervalue
companies near or already in bankruptcy.

Knowing what to look for in

bankruptcy cases is the answer for investors.

Someone knowledgeable in

the bankruptcy laws; who keeps abreast of news from the courts, and who
carefully considers the managanent of a firm, can survive the specter of
bankruptcy, and perhaps even profit from it.

ABSTRACr

THE POSITION OF THE STCX:KHOLDER
IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Daniels. Yinger
The University of North Dakota Graduate Center, 1989
Faculty Advisor:

Orville Goulet

The fate of a stockholder's investment in declining corporation
depends on what the company does before and during bankruptcy.

It is

certainly possible that the firm may end up being liquidated with the
stockholder loosing everything.

On the other hand, the company can be

bought by another f irrn, merge with a more successful entity, or even
successfully reorganize alone to become a highly profitable firm.

Just

which of these events will come to pas~ is not always certain.

It

depends on the legal envirornnent the company is faced with before and
after the bankruptcy decision is made.

In addition, market and

financial factors influence this chain of events.

Finally, and rrost

importantly, the way a company's manage:nent acts in times of austerity
and crisis may be the best indication of the future fate of the
business.
An

investor must be alert to changes in the bankruptcy laws and

their interpretation; he or she must also actively assess the market,

ix

financial conditions, and management's decisions in this environment.
The rewards for the vigilant stockholder are clear, while the costs of
neglect are also apparent.

This paper will highlight the recent laws

and court decisions effecting bankruptcy.

It gives insight into the

possible actions a firm can take as it enters this turbulent phase of
its life.

Finally, it consolidates the opinions of financial writers

concerning the subject of bankruptcy which stockholders can use for
investment decisions before, during, and after bankruptcy.

X

l

I

CHAPTER l
INTRODUCTION

The subject of this paper is bankruptcy's influence on the
stockholder.

A majority of investors would view this subject as a

rather simple problem.
late.

Their answer would be to get out before its too

For many stockholders, the solution is not so simple.

bankruptcy is not easy.

Losses at first may prompt them to believe

their stock will eventually climb back.

They continue to hang on to

their investment even when bankruptcy is declared.
finally end up in this situation.
investors.

Predicting

Many stockholders

The environment now changes for these

They must face the complicated and ever changing bankruptcy

laws and court decisions in hope of getting some of their money back.
As with most investment situations, knowledge is the key to survival.
In order to prevent the loss of their investment, the stockholder must
understand his rights and liabilities in the firm.
for ways to improve their financial position.
out or ride out the storm is a tough one.

They must also look

Their decision to bail

The investor well armed with

knowledge of the market and corporate management can make this decision.
To complicate life for investors, the aftermath of the bankruptcy
controversy in the early 1980 's caused many laws and procedures for
dealing with debtors to be rewritten.
confusion and opportunity for investors.
1

This change has created both
The confusion was the result

2

of ignorance about the new laws and past prejudice concerning the topic.
Those who took the time to study the new laws and their effects on the
stockholder were able to properly analyze the true value of a firm.
While other

investors were uncertain and panicky,

these more

knowledgeable individuals could score healthy profits even during
bankruptcy proceedings.

RESEARCH OBJECI'IVE

The objectives of this paper are to (1) look at develop;nents in
bankruptcy law,
stockholders,

(2) discuss the rights and liabilities of corporate
(3) examine techniques to predict bankruptcy, and

(4)

investigate options stockholders have before and during bankruptcy in
order to assist stockholders in making im:p:,rtant investment decisions.

METH(X)()L(X;Y

AND PROCEDURE

This paper compiles the information currently available in the
public dcmain through journals, magazine and newspaper articles, and
legal texts, and as such, is secondary research.

This research does not

attempt to generate new statistical information or generate new theories
on bankruptcy law or bankruptcy financing.

The facts provided in the

sources used to create this independent stlrly are not subjected to
primary verification.

The portions of the paper dealing with bankruptcy

law are taken from legal texts and actual cases.

Soma verification of

these sources can be assumed when the sa~e fact or idea is expressed by
several different writers.

The nature of this paper as a guide for

------------------------~---
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investors does not question the integrity of the authors used as a
source for

its TIBterials.

Many of the ideas concerning bankruptcy

financing are expressed as a matter of opinion from experienced
financial writers.

The investor must beware that these authors'

opinions are based on unique market experiences and different risk
preferences.

The reader should consider his or her own circumstances

and risk preferences when deciding to follow the investment strategies
describ2d in this paper.

LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
The complex nature of business law has resulted on many different
regulations dealing with the specific types of personal and corporate
bankruptcy.

Clearly, only certain laws pertain to the corporate

stockholder, and these will b2 addressed in this paper.

Although there

are several bankruptcy chapters contained in Title II of the united
States Code, Chapters 7 and 11 are the most important to corporate
stockholders.

Chapter 7, known as straight bankruptcy, determines how a

firm will b2 liquidated, and in turn, how much the stockholders will
receive.

Chapter 11,

reorganizations,

corporate stockholders.

is the most

important to

Only in reorganization will the present

stockholders have some choice in the outcome of their investment.

Thus

this paper will concentrate on only these Chapters in federal bankruptcy
law.
ORG.~IZATION OF THIS STUDY

This paper is written to educate the investor on bankruptcy.

In

order to do this, it will b2gin with a brief history of bankruptcy law,

4

followed by a discussion of the current laws regulating insolvent firms.
This section will provide the reader with a historical perspective of
bankruptcy law.

Here the volatility of these laws will become apparent.

This introduction to past bankruptcy law will give the stockholder a
better appreciation of how the present bankruptcy regulations arose.
The laws discussed will be the federal laws applicable to all states.
Some of the numerous and varied state laws on the subject wi 11 be
discussed only where they impact the investor directly.

Next, a review

of stockholder rights and liabilities within a bankrupt corporation will
conclude the discussion of the legal position of the stockholder in
bankruptcy.
Once given a

clear notion of how bankruptcy effects

stockholder, avoidance options will be looked at.

The investor seeking

to avoid bankruptcy must recognize the warning signs of it.
predicting a corporation's demise are covered

the

Methods of

in Chapter 3.

This

chapter will present several methods of analysis currently available to
any investor to judge the likelihood of bankruptcy for a firm.

By

recognizing the warning signs a stockholder can avoid the issue of
bankruptcy entirely.
Certain 1 y the management of a company should recognize these
warning signs the11selves.

They may develop: a defensive posture in

their business practices.

The stockholder must assess the impact of

this posturing on their

investment.

Chapter 4 will discuss what a

bankruptcy candidate can do to protect itself and what stockholders
should look for in management's decisions.

This information will help

them decide whether management has the ability to turn the firm around

5

or if a merger or acquisition is the only way out.

Finally, refinancing

via mergers and buy-outs will l:e discussed briefly, along with its
impact on corporate equity holders.
Even in the event bankruptcy cannot be avoided, stockholders may
still have some options available to them.

Thus the final chapter of

this paper will address what the stockholder can do if he finds himself
in this unfortunate situation.

The stockholder's options at this point

will hinge on their ability to determine the probability of survival for
the firm.
does,

Since the future of the firm will depend on what managenent

the stockholder must consider management's capabilities and

intentions thoroughly.
reorganized the firm?

ooes management have a viable plan to

If so, do they have the ability to make it work?

These questions must be answered in order for the stockholder to
properly value the firm.

The opinions of financial writers are given

concerning these important questions.

The surrmary provides review of

the pertinent ideas expressed in the paper and concludes with this
author's assessment of the investment strategies given.

CHAPI'ER 2

BANKRUTPCY LAW
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Current bankruptcy law is the result of an evolutionary process
in the concept of commercial morality.
designed for two purposes:

Bankruptcy is essentially

first; to provide relief and protection to

debtors who have made bad business decisions; and second, to provide a
means for the fair distribution of the debtor's assets to all
creditor .1

the

Al though bankruptcy law has sought both debtor relief and

the payment of creditors from its early beginnings in ancient Rorre,
different aspects of the law have been favored over its history.
The word bankruptcy comes fran the i talian words "BANCA ROTTA, 11
meaning spoiled trading place. 2

Bankruptcy law treated the debtor as

irrrnoral, and advocated liquidation of all th: debtor's assets as the
only means of satisfying creditor's demands.

The prevalent attitudes

during those early days favored public humiliation as a means to deter
other debtors,
bankrupt.

rather than to provide for the rehabilitation of the

The debtor was usually required to \llear some for:n of mark,

usually special clothing, to show his disgrace.

EVen after this ordeal,

full discharge of the debt was not granted, even if all the debtor's
!Kenneth w. Clarkson, Roger L. Miller, and Gaylord A. Jentz, west's
Business Law, 3rd ed., (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1986), 527.
2Encyclopedia Britannica,

1964 ed., s. v. "Bankruptcy."
6
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property had been liquidated.
discharge provision was

It wasn't until 1705 when the first

included into English law.

This provision

allowed for the termination of the debt after the court distributed the
debtor's assets.

Creditors would have to be satisfied with whatever the

court decided to distribute to them.
resume life with a clean slate.

This feature allowed debtors to

Even with the discharge provision,

English law fell quite short of being a
bankrupt.

In fact,

law to rehabilitate

the

the English continued the custom of wearing

humiliating clothing into the latter nineteenth century.
As with a great deal of American legal concepts, bankruptcy law
in the United States borrowed much fran England.

The w:d ters of the

U.S. Constitution gave consideration to bankruptcy proceedings in
Article 1, Section 8, "The Congress shall have the pov-1er ••• to establish
• • • uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United
States. 11 3

Congress did atte11pt to exercise its constitutional grant

several times during the last two hundred years.

Congressional action

typically came after periods of economic depression.
were passed by the Federalists in 1800.

The first laws

It was quickly repealed in 1803

because farmers thought it unfair, favoring the merchant class.

Thirty

eight years passed before Congress touched on the subject of bankruptcy
again.

Spurred by over-speculation and economic collapse in 1837,

Congress rapidly passed a bankruptcy law in 1841.

Tre new law was

repealed after less than a year in a storm of controversy ..
instance

the public viewed

the

law as

too

liberal on debtors.

Bankruptcy was still considered irrrnoral by the public.
3clarkson, West's Business Law, 527.

In this

The Civil War
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produced the third econanic crisis that precipitated the Bankruptcy Act
of 1867.

This law lasted longer, surviving eleven years before its

repeal due to administrative defects and creditor attacks.
Current bankruptcy law stems from an ai.-nended form of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

This Act was a belated atte:npt to assist

financially strapped speculators trapped in the panic of 1893.

Although

this law has not been repealed to date, it has been extensively amended
in the 1930 's and in 1978.

The amendments of the 1930 's made the law

more cornprehens i ve than ever before, covering the bankruptcy of
individuals and large corporations.

These amendments, born in the

distressed era of the depression, were the first to truly anphasize the
rehabilitation of the bankrupt.
bankrupt in these provisions.

The debtor was no longer labeled

Writers of the law were hoping to reduce

the stigma of bankruptcy by elimination the word.4

The revisions of the

depression era culminated with the Chandler Act of 1938.
noteworthy for stockholders because Chapter 10

This Act is

(reorganizations)

Chapter 11 (arrangements) were introduced for the first time.

and

Thus a

means to recover something of the original investment was provided for
investors.
until 1978.

The Chandler Act was able to survive in its original form
At that time, the complexities of innovative American

financial structures outstripped the law's capacity to deal with new
business entities.

Debtors sought relief, and Congress provided it with

the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

41bid. 528.
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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACr OF 1978
The Reform Act did much to change the face of American
Bankruptcy.

The following new rules were introduced:

1.

Establish~ent of a bankruptcy court system with
comprehensive jurisdiction over all cases governed
by Title 11 of the United States Code;

2.

Strengthening the judicial status of the forcrer
trustees in bankruptcy;

3.

Launching of an official trustee system as a pilot
project;

4.

Consolidation of arrangement under former Chapter XI
and reorganization under former Chapter x into a single
chapter called Reorganization.

5.

Transfer of rules governing automatic stays into the
law and restriction of the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court in bankruptcy matters;

6.

Abolition of the balance sheet test of solvency as a
condition for involuntary proceedings.S

These new laws soon became the center of controversy.

Critics

claimed the main flaw was that the law was too easy on debtors; both
individuals and corporations.

Al though Congress wrote the law to

streamline h:mkruptcy proceedings, they failed to see the backlash it
would cause.
The greatest problems ste'1med form the fact it was easier to
declare bankruptcy and have all debts frozen.

The effect of this law

was to increase the number of bankruptcies dramatically.

In the law's

first year of operation, fran 1 October 1979 to 1 October 1980, U.S.

Ssarnuel J. M. Donnely et al., Bankruptcy, Arrangements, and
Reorganization (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1972) 509.
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bankruptcy cases rose 59 percent. 6

Not only was the stigma of

bankruptcy diminished, it was now a popular method to escape debt.

This

observation was backed up by a 1981 study by Purdue University's Credit
Research Center.

Their findings revealed that 4 out of 10 people who

filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief could have paid 50 percent or more
of their non-mortgage obligations over the following five years;

29

percent could have repaid all of them.7
Corporations quickly saw the advantages of the bankruptcy
The 1978 laws made it easy for companies to declare

umbrella.

bankruptcy thus freezing their debts, but still retaining control of the
ccmpany.

As a result corporate bankruptcies also increased dramatically

after enactment of the 1978 law.

Table 1 on the next page depicts the

rapid increase in bankruptcies starting in 1980.

Although all fonns of

bankruptcies increased following the passage of the law, voluntary
filings and Chapter 11 bankruptcies are particularly noteworthy.

These

indicate the willingness of companies to file for bankruptcy voluntarily
and use Chapter 11 as a means to solve corporate financial problens.
Although creditors were quite upset by this new liberal use of
bankruptcy protection as a means to eliminate corporate debt, it was
managements use of new law to abrogate labor contracts and stall law
suits that caused the most controversy.

This all began when a

New

Jersey firm, Bildisco, nullified its labor agreements in bankruptcy.

6Mary-Margaret Wantuck, "A Better Balance In Bankruptcy Law,"
Nation's Business, April 1985, 50.
71bid.

Table 1.
BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS FILED, BY TYPE AND CHAPTER:

1975

TO

1986

[For years ending June 30]

1975

ITEM

1978

Total ............................... 254,484 202,951

Business .................................
Non-business .........................
Voluntary ................................
Involuntary ..............................
Chapter 7 3 ............................
Chapter 9 4 ............................
Chapter 11 5 ..........................
Chapter 13 6 ..........................
Section 304 1 .........................

1980

1979
226,476

-30,130
30,528
29,500
224,354 172,423 196,976
253,198 201,944 225,549
927
1,286
1,007
209,330 168,771 183,259
1
2
3,042
3,506
3,266
30,185
39,442
41,178
(X)
(x)
(X)

2

1

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

277,880 360,329 367,866

374,734

344,275

364,536

477,856

36,449
47,415
56,423
241,431 312,914 311,443
276,691 358,997 366,331
1,535
1,189
1,332
214,357 265,721 255,098
1
4
5,302
7,828
14,059
86,778
98,705
58,216
1
5
-

69,818
304,916
373,064
1,670
251,322
3
21,207
102,201
1

62,170
282,105
342,828
1,447
232,994
4
19,913
91,358
6

66,651
297,885
362,939
1,597
244,650
3
21,425
98,452
6

76,281
401,575
476,214
1,642
332,679
7
24,443
120,726
1

1 For the first three months of 1980 the judiciary operated under the Bankruptcy
- Represents zero.
X Not applicable.
Act and for the last nine months under the new bankruptcy code established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Includes only
2
those petitions filed under the new bankruptcy code.
Includes five Section 304 cases filed under the Reform Act in 1980 and
3
1 in 1981 which are not included in the subcategories of voluntary/involuntary.
Chapter 7, liquidation of non-exempt assets of
4 Chapter 9, adjustment of debts of a municipality.
5 Chapter 11, individual or business
businesses or individuals.
6 Chapter 13, adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income.
7 11 U.S.C., Section 304, cases
reorganization.
ancillary to foreign proceedings.

Reprinted from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States: 1988, (108th edition.) Washington, DC, 1987

t--'
t--'
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The court upheld the opinion that this labor agreement amounted to a
form of corporate debt.

This tactic stepped into the public spotlight

when Frank Lorenzo, chairman of Continental Airlines, filed for Chapter
11 to free Continental of its labor agreements.

Several other companies

joined suit, riding on the coattails of the Bildisco Precedent,
including Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.. and Wilson Foods Corp.8
Labor, frustrated by this new form of "creative management pressed
Congress for relief.
Bankruptcy protection was also used in other controversial ways.
On

August 26, 1982, Manville Corp, then still solvent, filed Chapter 11

to hold back the tide of pending asbestos product liability suits.
Manville was the most successful company to file for Chapter 11. 9
Despite the public's displeasure with this filing, the bankruptcy court
froze all liability suits against Manville Corp.

The :rrove drew some

admiration frcrn the business corrmunity, seeing it as a creative response
to its liability problem.
1984 AMENDMENI'S

The new use of bankruptcy as a managanent tool pro~pted creditors
and liability representatives to push for a better balance in the law.
Ironically, the supreme Court provided the strongest impetus for a
review of the 1978 law.

In 1982, the Constitutionality of the Reform

Act was successfully challenged.

The Supreme Court decided in Northern

8williarn B. Glaberson, Mark Ivey, and Matt Rothman, "Chapter 11
Isn't so Chic Anymore," Business Week, 16 June 1986, 35.
9Ibid.
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Pipeline Co.

v.

Marathon Pipeline Co.

that

the broad

judicial

jurisdiction given to the bankruptcy judges by Congress was in violation
of Article

III of the U.S. Constitution.10

At a

time when an

unprecedented number of bankruptcy cases v,1ere being filed,
was brought to a stands ti 11.

the system

The Supre-ne Court stayed its decision

until 24 December 1983 allowing Congress to act on this new decision.
Legal authority for bankruptcy judges was extended four times after
Congress failed to pass new legislation .11

The biggest problem for

Congress was the intense dispute between labor and business over the
Bildisco Precedent.
Congress chose the middle ground amending the 1978 law.

In

regards to the role of bankruptcy judges, Congress debated whether or
not to give them lifetime tenure to ensure they are free of pressure
from the executive and
Congress,

on 28

legislative branches

June 1984,

of

the government.

elected to avoid the issue by placing

bankruptcy judges under U.S. District Court Judges who do have lifetime
tenures.12

The Amendment created two hundred and thirty two bankruptcy

judgeships in the various judicial districts throughout the United
States.

The judges themselves still had fourteen year appointments,

with a much more limited role.

The new role of the bankruptcy court was

10clarkson, 529.
llLeonard M. Ap:::ar and Robert E. Taylor, "House-Senate Conferees
Resolve Disputes On Bankruptcy Bill; Approval Is Expected," Wall Street
Journal, 28 Jun 1984, p. 3.
12Jonathan Dahl, "New Bankruptcy Law causes Confusion Amid Claims
That It Is Unconstitutional," Wall Street Journal, 13 July 1984, p. 3.
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to fulfill the role of an administrative court for the district court
concerning matters of bankruptcy.13
Labor and management both lobbied vigorously to promote their
interests in the new laws.

Congress chose a compromise between the two

positions, reluctant to solve the dispute during an election year.14
The final amendment still allowed managanent to reject a labor contract,
but it forced them to negotiate with the unions prior to a court hearing
on the issue.

Management now had to prove to the bankruptcy court judge

that rejection of the contract was necessary to ensure the survival of
the corporation and protect creditor interests.

In this process,

manage~ent was required to confer with the union and provide financial
data to it.15
The passing of the 1984 a~end~ent brought bankruptcy law into its
present form.

Still arguably ambiguous in places, it has survived the

test of cons ti tutionali ty.
the stockholder the most.

It is this a~bigui ty which should concern
Although the law may keep a company alive,

'
its assets, and hence the stockholders may
be tied up in litigation for

months or years.

The equity owner of a bankrupt firm must be aware of

the court as a fundamental player in the firm's destiny.

The court is

there to protect the value of the corporation, but its actions may go
contrary to the wishes of the stockholders.
important aspects of modern bankruptcy law.
13clarkson, 529.
14Apcar, p. 3.
15rbid.

The next section will cover

15

Title ll of the United States Code consists of nire chapters.
Eight are odd numbered.

Chapters 1, 3, and 5 contain definitions and

provisions governing case administration, creditors, the debtor, and the
estate.

These chapters universally apply to all bankruptcies.

The

following chapters in the Code address specific aspects of bankruptcy.
Chapter 7 makes provisions for the liquidation of estates owned by
individuals and corporations.
municipalities.
corporations.

Chapter 9 provides for

the debts of

Chapter 11 governs reorganizations for individuals and
The newest addition, Chapter 12, is used to reorganize

the debts of financially distressed farmers.

Chapter 13 provides for

the adjustment of debts owed by individuals with a regular

incorre.

Finally, Chapter 15 established a United States trustee system.
Chapters 7 and 11 apply to corporation, and are therefore most important
to the equity holder.

FILit«; FOR BANKRUPTCY
A corporation can file either voluntarily or be placed into
bankruptcy involuntarily by creditors.
bankruptcy is simple.

The process of voluntary

The debtor corporation just files the official

forms designated for that purpose in the bankruptcy court.

There is no

requirement for the debtor corporation to be insolvent in order to do
this.

The bankruptcy li~ting must contain the following information:
1.
A list of secured and unsecured creditors, and the
amount of debt owed to each.

2.

A statement of the financial affairs of the debtor.
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3. A list of all property owned by the debtor, including
property claimed by the debtor to be exempt.
4.

A listing of current income and expenses.16

Once the paperwork is filed and found to be in order, an order for
relief will be given by the court.
Involuntary bankruptcy occurs when the debtor corporation is
forced into bankruptcy by its creditors.

The creditors do this because

they believe that further operation of the company will erode the
interests tied up in it.
this.

Creditors are under s~'Tle restrictions in doing

If the debtor has twelve or more creditors, three or rrore of

these creditors having unsecured claims aggregating at least $5,000 must
join in the petition.17

If there are fewer than twelve, than any

creditor with a claL~ of at least $5,000 may file.
challenge this petition.

The debtor firm may

If it does, a trial will be held to see if the

debtor is generally paying its debts.

When the bankruptcy court

determines the creditors have a valid case, the debtor will be given an
order for relief and required to supply the information listed above.

AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION

The intent of bankruptcy law is to provide some breathing room
for debtors while they get their affairs in order.

The act of filing a

petition for bankruptcy operates to suspend almost all actions by
creditors against the debtor or the debtor's property.

In addi tioo,

creditors are not allowed to continue or begin any legal activities
16clarkson, 529.
17rbid.

17

against the firm to recover claims.

This freezing of creditors actions

against the debtor firm is known as the automatic stay provision.
Bankruptcy laws are quite clear and restrictive on this provision.

"Any

creditor who knowingly violates this stay is subject to pay damages and
even punitive charges.18

THE TRUSTEE

The act of filing for bankruptcy does create an order for relief,
protecting the firm fran the outside.

To protect it from the inside,

the court depends on the sound management of the company.

If the court

is convinced that the existing management has the ability to safely
operate the firm then they will be allo~d to continue operation as a
debtor-in-possession.

If however,

the court believes that gross

mismanagement is to bla~e, then a trustee will be called in to operate
the firm.19

In essence, the court is seeking to preserve the assets for

the creditors.
debtor.

The trustee will literally step into the shoes of the

.

It is hoped the trustee will turn the business around and make

it profitable once more.

Some businessmen make it their careers to find

a failing company and turn it around.

They take pride in being able to

use their own personal management techniques to solve the difficult
problems of reorganization.
courts for their services.

These individuals are rewarded by the

For the successful turn around artist the

rewards are more than monetary compensation; personal satisfaction in
reviving a dying firm is the strongest motivator.
lBrbid, 530.
19rbid, 540.

The trustee can do

18

this because the court allows than to make contracts,

formulate the

reorganization plan, and finally execute it.

CRIDITOR'S RIGHTS
Not al 1 creditors have the same right to the assets of the
Although all claims are allowed unless contested by the

debtor.

trustee, debtor, or another creditor, a hierarchy exists among those
claims.20

The highest priority goes to secured creditors.

These

creditors have a security interest in collateral that secures the debt.
The debtor is allowed to keep the secured collateral, but must file a
statement with the court clerk as to what the debtor intends to do with
the collateral.

If the debtor relinquishes the property to the

creditor, the creditor can take it in full satisfaction of the debt.
Secured creditors are allowad to add in the costs of damages if the
collateral is worth more than the amount of the claim.
proceeds will be returned to the debtor.

'Any additional

If the secured collateral is

insufficient to retire the debt, then tne secured creditor will becane
an unsecured creditor for the difference.21
The debts owed to unsecured creditors may not be paid until the
more senior claims of secured creditors are paid.
"absolute priority rule. 0 22

This is known as the

This rule governs all the classes of debt.

201bid, 534.
2lrbid, 534.
22oav id M. Powlen and Arnold H. WUhrman, "Good News, Bad News for
Creditors," ABA Banking Journal, June 1988, 42.
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The following hierarchy exists a"tlong unsecured creditors for

their

claims to the debtor's estate:
1.

Trustees' costs involved in the proceedings.

2.
Expenses after an involuntary case has begun but
before a trustee is appointed.
3. Wages due workers if earned within three months prior
to filing the petition in bankruptcy; not to exceed $2,000
per person ..
4.
Claims for unpaid contributions to e:nployee benefit
plans to have been paid within six months prior to filing.
5. Unsecured claims for customer deposits, with a maximum
of $900 per individual.
6.
Taxes due to federal, state, county, and any other
goverTh'llental agencies.
7. Unfunded pension plan liabilities have priority over
general creditors up to 30 percent of the sum of common
and preferred equity; the balance represents a claim on
the same level as the general creditors.
8.
General creditor claims such as trade credit,
unsecured loans, debenture bonds, and the unsatisfied
portions of the secured loans and unfunded pension plans.
9. Preferred stockholders can receive up to the par value
of the issue.
10.

Co."TlffiOn stockholders receive anything that rernains.23

rt is clear the common stockholder is in a precarious position in a
bankrupt corporation.

In essence, as owners of the corporation they are

paying the debts of the firm.

23J. Fred h1eston, and Thomas E. Copeland, Managerial Finance, 8th
ed., (Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1986), 960.
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DISCllAR:iE OF DEBT

The primary reason for

the bankruptcy laws is to allow the

bankrupt firm to obtain a fresh start through the discharge of debts.
Discharge is granted to the firm when it has paid off the debts required
of it in its liquidation or reorganization plan.

This plan is developed

in a meeting between the firm's management and its creditors.

The

details are worked up and the creditors are allowed to vote on it.

If a

two thirds majority of creditors accept the plan the bankruptcy court
will confirm it and discharge all debt not covered by the plan.

If the

plan is not accepted, a new plan will have to be developed, voted on, and
sul::mitted to the court for confirmation.

If only one class of claims has

accepted the plan, the court may still confirm the plan and force the
other classes of creditors to accept it.

This forcing of creditors to

accept the plan is known as the "cram doYlt"l" provision of the Code.24

The

courts will generally resort to this unpopular tactic when agreement
am:>ng creditors is unlikely.
Some debts cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.

In corporate

bankruptcy the exceptions to discharge include:
1.
Claims for back taxes accruing within three years
prior to bankruptcy.

2.
Claims against property or rroney obtained by the
debtor firm under false pretenses or by false
representations.
3.

unscheduled claims.

4.
Claims based on fraud or misuse of funds by the
debtor, or claims involving the firm's embezzlement or
larceny.

24clarkson, 541.
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5.

Fines and penalties payable to government units.25

These exceptions to discharge do not change the way the firm's
assets are distributed to creditors.

The debtor still remains liable for

the unpaid portion of these claims.

Credi tors were reluctant to

challenge the discharge of debts by the bankruptcy courts prior to 1984.
This was primarily because the creditor would have to pay all court and
attorney costs associated with the challenge to discharge.

The 1984

amendment made it possible for the creditor to avoid these costs if their
challenge was substantially justified.26
Discharge issues now frequently surface in bankruptcy courts.

An

example of one such issue involves the liability to clean up a toxic
waste dump by a company in bankruptcy.

The state of Ohio took Chern-Dyne

Corp. to court to get them to clean up the toxic dump near Hasnilton,
Ohio.

When the company failed to comply with the court order, the court

appointed a receiver to run the company and seize its assets.

Before its

assets were fully seized, however, the firm's ovmer declared bankruptcy.
The state of Ohio argued that envirorul'lental cleanup costs should be
exempted from discharge.

The Supreme Court finally resolved the issue,

agreeing with the lower courts that environmental cleanup liability fell
under the bankruptcy law's definition of debt, and as such, would not be
exempted from discharge.27

25rbid, 535.
26rbid.
27stephen Werrniel, "High Court Limits States' Right to Pursue Some
Polluters Who File for Bankruptcy, wall Street Journal, 10 January 1985,
p. 14.
11
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RIDRGANIZATION

The above principles of law give an overview of the law effecting
corporate liquidations and reorganizations.

Chapter 11 reorganizations

are specifically characterized by the duration of the proceedings and the
costs of those proceedings.

In a Chapter 11 suit, the firm may take 120

days after the order for relief to file a plan for reorganization.

At

the end of this deadline, any party, firm or creditor, is allowed to
submit a plan.

This rule is not inflexible, extensions are normally

granted by the court.28

These extensions are usually granted to the

larger firms due to the greater complexities of their cases.

Some of the

companies involved in major bankruptcy cases have taken years to sub.~it a
plan for reorganization.

As an example, the Baldwin-United bankruptcy in

Cincinnati took over two an a half years to resolve.
the plan is also quite time consuming.

The execution of

The bankruptcy of A.H. Robins in

1985 is still not successfully resolved.

An

advantage of this lengthy

convalescent period for the firm is the freedom it offers the management
of the c01~pany.

Management, unless it has shown gross incompetence, will

usually be left alone to run the company as it sees fit.29

Courts will

not usually step into the day-to-day operations of the company if
management is keeping to the reorganization plan.
The principle disadvantage for the company is the expense of
reorganization.

Stockholders and creditors should

re

aware that court

costs and attorney fees have the highest priority clam over all unsecured
28Ted Pollard, "Filing for Chapter 11 is a Way for Companies to Gain
Time,"Middleto'WI1 (Ohio) Journal, 6 Sept 1986.
29rbid.
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The expense of legal services in reorganization can be a serious

debt.

detriment to the company.

The management of a firm should weigh this

factor heavily before deciding to file for bankruptcy.

The controversy

surrounding recent management decisions in bankruptcy coupled with the
general ambiguity of the bankruptcy laws thanselves point to longer and
more expensive reorganizations for firms.

RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF STOCKHOLDERS
OURINS BANKRUPTCY
SHAREHOIDER RIGHTS
The rights of stockholders essentially do not change during a
firm's failure.

What does change is the involvanent of additional actors

in the control of the firm; namely, the creditors and the courts.
this manner, the p:>wer of the shareholder is diminished greatly.

In
The

stockholder's primary means of ownership control is his or her vote.
Through their votes, stockholder elected the board of directors, which in
turn are trusted to run the corporation for the stockholders.

Prior to

and during bankruptcy the board may elect to take actions on matters
outside the ordinary business of the company.

The lx>ard must obtain

stockholder approval for all extraordinary business conducted by the
firm. 30

Examples of extraordinary matters include the sale, lease, or

exchange of all or a substantial portion of the corporation's assets,
amending the articles of incorporation, transactions concerning mergers
or consolidation, and the final dissolution of the form.31

Stockholders,

however, can take more direct intervention in the operations of a failing
30clarkson, 708.
3lrbid.
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firm.

The Model Act, Section 97, permits a minority stockholder to

petition a court to appoint a receiver to run the corporation or to
liquidate its business assets in the following instances:
1.
The directors are deadlocked in the management of
corporate affairs, shareholders are unable to break that
deadlock, and irreparable injury to the corporation is
being suffered or threatened.

2. The acts of the directors or those in control of the
firm are illegal, oppressive, or frau:3ulent.
3.

Corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.32

In addition to the control rights of the stockholder,

equity

holders of a firm are entitled to the assets left over after dissolution.
Unfortunately, for stockholders, their low status on claims of unsecured
debt usually means nothing is left over for them.

SHAREHOIDER LIABILITIES

Generally there is no legal relationship between share holders and
creditors of a corporation.

Although it is possible for a stockholder to

also be a creditor of the firm, they have no special status above other
creditors.

There are certain exceptions to this limited liability rule.

The first of these favor the stockholder and concerns

an exception to

the absolute priority rule for unsecured creditor claims known as the
"new value exception. 11 33

During Chapter 11 reorganization the firm may

convince stockholders to invest fresh capital into the firm to help it
convalesce.

The bankruptcy courts have decided that stockholders should

not be liable for this new money invested in the firm.
32rbid, 700.
33powlen, 42.

Thus the claims
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of stockholders who invest new money will be honored above all creditors.
This exception only applies to the new rn::mey invested, not to the
stockholder's original investment.
Certain circumstances can make the stockholders of a
personally liable for

its debts.

firm

In these instances the court will

dis regard the corporate structure and make individual stockholders
personally liable.
corporate vei 1. 11 34

This act of the court is known as "piercing the
The following incidents may allow the courts to

disregard the corporate entity:
1. The inadequate capitalization of the firm when it is
formed.
2.
A party is tricked or mislead into dealing with the
corporation rather than the individual.
3.
The corporation is set up to never make a profit or
will always be insolvent.
4. The shareholder or director unconditionally guarantees
to be personally liable for corporate obligations and/or
debts.
5. Failure to follow statutory corporate formalities such
as failure to hold and record minutes of board of
directors' meetings or shareholders continuous, personal
use of corporation property.35
Incidents of "piercing the corporate veil II are fairly rare and

the

courts will only resort to this when the corporation is clearly a front
to shield its owners from liability.
The controversy created in the early 1980' s has prompted some
states, most notably Wisconsin, to enact state bankruptcy laws which open
the stockholder to additional liability.
34clarkson, 663.
35Ibid, 663.

According to Wisconsin law a
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stockholder may be held liable for unpaid anployee wages at the time of

bankruptcy.36

This liability extends l:)eyond the shareholder's investment

to include an additional amount equal to his or her initial investment in
the firm or the par value of the stock owned, whichever is greater.
Although this law has only been used twice, it has been attacked on the
grounds that it increases investor risk and thus hampers investment
within the state.

SUMMARY
The evolution of bankruptcy law has been shaped by the prevailing
economic forces of the times.
ever changing law.

This has created a clearly dynamic and

Its recent changes have been made to provide a better

balance between debtor and creditor interests.
stockholder, hoW=ver, remains precarious.

The position of the

Many parts of bankruptcy and

corporate law are meant to protect the shareholders, but the fact
remains, stockholders have the lov1=st claim to the firm• s assets and
stand to lose their investment.

'

For the risk adverse investor the best

way is to avoid the issue of b3nkruptcy all together by selling when the
firm begins to fail.

The tirre of failure is not easy to determine.

The

next chapter wi 11 cover the :rrethoos stockholders can use to predict
bankruptcy and avoid it.

36chuck Martin, "Change Would Reduce Investors' Risk," The Mih..aukee
(Wisconsin) Journal, 16 Apr 1987.

CHAPTER 3

PRIDICTORS OF CORPOAATE BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION

It is not surprising that investors have always sought a way to
predict the future of financial institutions.
are the prospect for a firm's bankruptcy.

Chief a~ong their concerns
Many methods have been

developed over the years that use the current and past financial data of
a company to estimate the probability of a firm's demise.
cards at a blackjack table,

Like counting

financial analysts use these methods to

assess the possibilities of unfortunate developments in the future.
Naturally,

these methods began with the most readily available

information from the finn:

accounting data released by the business.

Accounting data, however, was shown to have some shortcanings in its
consistency and in its ability to serve as a predictor of bankruptcy.
Later, as improved forecasting techniques were sought, market analysis
and subjective factor analysis were brought into the picture.
will look at each of these methods,

This paper

revealing their strengths and

highlighting their limitations.
Long before

trouble develops,

companies send out signals

foretelling the heal th of the firm, just as the chanistry of the blood
can foretell the health of the body.
signals in a myriad of forms.

Businesses send out many such

These forms

include

information

deliberately released by the organization and also information leaked
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outside the firm inadvertently.

The task of finding accurate and

reliable predictors is difficult.

The investor must determine which

elements of information to use and under what conditions they work.
An

investor is also limited in the amount of tirre and expense they can

devote to the analysis of these many signals.

As a result, much of the

work concerned with finding the predictors of bankruptcy involves
analysis of the easy to obtain information released by the firm and the
market.

Once this data is gathered, correlations with the probability of

bankruptcy can be drawn.

A<XXXJNTING DATA

METHODS

OF PREDICTION

Accounting data can tell us much about a co~pany.

On the surface

they allow us to discern the bottom line of corporate operations:
business actually making a profit?

rs the

Although this will give a snapshot of

the health of the firm at a given moment, it is a poor predictor of
corporate bankruptcy.

It is possible to'sustain losses in the short run

and still be a successful company in the long run.

It became clear that

a more in depth analysis of accounting data was necessary to provide an
accurate bankruptcy prediction model.

This analysis lead to the

development of two powerful models of bankruptcy forecasting:

Multiple

Discriminant Analysis (Altman's Z) and funds flow analysis.
Multiple Discriminant Analysis

Multiple Discriminant Analysis

(MDA)

uses financial ratios

obtained from the balance sheet and incorre statenents of companies to
create a m:>del of business failure.

Financial ratios alone give us much
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information about a firm, but they are used best when compared with the
ratios of other companies in the industry, or when compared with the
ratios of the firm over several years.

V'fuen one ratio is compared with

another it is called univariate analysis.l

In 1968, Edward I. Altman

discovered that univariate analysis was limited in its ability to predict
corporate bankruptcy. 2
predictive model.

He decided to combine different ratios into a

The combination of these different ratios allows us to

classify a firm into two or more groupings.
multiple discriminant analysis.

This technique is known as

Altman could now classify businesses

into two groups; those firms that had a healthy outlook, and those that
were destined toward bankruptcy.
Altman developed his formula by analyzing the data of 66
manufacturing firms over several years, 33 of which went bankrupt.3

He

looked at 22 different financial ratios and determined that five had some
power to predict the demise of the firm in the period prior to
bankruptcy.

These five ratios were:4
>

1.

Working capital/Total assets

2.

Retained earnings/Total assets

3.

EBIT/Total assets

4.

Market value of equity/Book value of debt

5.

Sales/Total assets

lJ. Fred Weston, and Thomas E. Copeland, Managerial Finance, 8th ed.,
(Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1986), 206.
2rbid.
3rbid.
4rbid. 201.
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Altman then weighted each of these ratios and combined than into one
equation, known as the Altman z formula.5
Z = .021X1 + .014X2 + .033X3 + .006X4 + .999X5

Using Alt~an's data, the mean z value for the 33 bankrupt finns was found
to be -0.2599, while the value for the healthy firms was 4.8863.

Altman

decided to use the midpoint between each of these values, 2.675, in order
to classify a company in one group or the other.

Thus, if a particular

corporation had a z value of 3 or greater, then chances are the firm will
not fall into bankruptcy.

However, if a firm's z value drops below 2,

bankruptcy may be on the horizon.
The Altman z has become a very popular tool in the diagnosing of
bankruptcy candidates.

Progra~s are appearing in spreadsheet software,

such as Lotus 1-2-3, that will auto~atically pull Altman z ratios off of
a canpany' s balance sheet and income state'i"Oent, and then compute a Z
value.6

Despite its p:>pularity, this method of bankruptcy prediction is

not without its faults.
data itself:

Chief among these faults is the source of the

accounting statements of· the firm.

Accounting data is

subject to differing interpretations and even manipulation.

Remember, a

firm can change its state~ents by simply using a different inventory
valuation method.

In this way assets can be distorted, resulting in a

distorted z e::Juation due to its heavy reliance on the value of total
assets.

users of the z formula should also beware of firms that use

different accounting periods or are subject to seasonal variations in

5rbid.
6Daniel Seligman, "Algebra is Destiny," Fortune, 18 August 1986, 77.
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sales. 7

Differences in the accounting data must be resolved before a

reliable z score can be obtained.
In addition to the above shortcomings, the z formula becomes only
marginally effective in predicting bankruptcy when one looks more than
two or three years into the future.

Altman himself found that the

greatest changes in a bankruptcy destined firm's financial ratios
occurred about two to three years before declaration of bankruptcy. 8
Even a low Z value does not necessarily mean that a firm is within a year
or two of bankruptcy.

Companies such as USX have had a Z score of less

than 1.8 for more than four years, saying that bankruptcy is not always
in a hurry.9
FUNDS FUM ANALYSIS

Funds flow analysis is the work of James Gentry, Paul Newbold, and
David Whitford.

They created this form of analysis in order to correct

the flaws in Altrnan's work, and provide a better prediction model.
idea behind funds flow is simple.

The

Al though ca sh inf lows equa 1 cash

outflows in an accounting context, the level and speed of the cash flows
provide us with information concerning managements' operating, investment
and financing decisions .10

This analysis of cash flows can then

7weston, Managerial Finance, 195.
81bid. 208.
9seligman, 80.
10James A. Gentry, Paul Newbold, and David T. Whitford, "Predicting
Bankruptcy: If cash Flow's Not the Bottom Line, What Is?," Financial Analysts
Journal, September-October 1985, 47.
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quantified and turned into a predictive model.

The authors identified

eight major net funds flow components:
- Operations
- Working capital
- Financial
- Fixed coverage exr,enses, or interest and lease
payments
- Capital expenditures
- Dividends
- Other asset and liability flows
- Change in cash and marketable securities
They then c0i.~p.1ted a total net cash flow for the firm.

Each of the above

funds flow components was divided by the total net cash flow to determine
the percentage contribution of each component to the total.11

Figure

on the next page gives an example of this form of analysis for
companies, Deere

&

A

two

Company and Massey-Ferguson.

Gentry, Newbold, and Whitford then gathered the data co 12 funds
flow measures.
components

Working capital was divided into five different

in order

over identification.

to

avoid

the

statistical

problem of

The data base consisted of several hundred firms

fran Cornpustat's Annual Irrlustrial Research File.

Of these, 92 canpanies

had failed, 68 of these were involved in bankruptcy proceedings and the
other 24 were already liquidated.12

ll1bid. 48.
12rbid. s1.

The average means and standard

Figure A.
Trends of Funds Flow Components for Deere & Company and
Massey-Ferguson, 1978-1982
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deviation for each of the funds flow components were computed for both
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms.

They are listed in Table 2.

Table 2.
Mean Net Funds Flow Componentslfotal Net
Flow for Failed ·and Nonfailed Companies
One Year Before Failure

Net F11nds Flow
Compo11ent .
Dit•ided by Total
Net Flow ([NF)
Operating
Working Capital
Other A&L
Financing
Fixed Coverage
Investment
Dividends
Cash & M.S.
Receivable
Inventory
Other CA
Payables
Other CL
TNFITA

Failed
Mca11
S.D.
0.528
0.163
0.453
0.130
-0.044
0.258
0.490
0.167
0.127
-0.152
0.288
-0.163
-0.018
0.050
0.290
-0.081
0.351
0.100
0.485
0.013
0.148
0.017
0.559
0.170
-0.172
0.680
0.140
0.257

Non/ailed
!vfca11
S.D.
0.556
-0.129
0.047
0.140
-0.080
-0.367
-0.092
-0.074
-0.169
-0.126
-0.020
0.101
0.085
0.226

0.247
0.344
0.178
0.369
0.095
0.267
0.103
0.243
0.257
0.246
0.065
0.393
0.241
0.025

Mean of Variable for Three Years Before Failure
Operating
0.288
0.344
0.588
0.228
Working Capital
0.007
0.291
-0.102
0.197
Other A&L
-0.018
0.202
0.029
0.064
Financing
0.120
0.342
0.090
0.211
Fixed Coverage
-0.126
0.100
- 0.079
0.062
Investment
-0.220
0.170
-0.364
0.211
Dividends
-0.002
0.049
-0.093
0.106
Cash&M.S.
-0.029
0.145
-0.068
0.108
Receivables
0.013
0.304
-0.151
0.195
Inventory
-0.061
0.211
-0.117
0.167
Other CA
-0.002
0.022
-0.015
0.032
Payables
0.147
0.260
' 0.139
0.212
Other CL
-0.089
0.389
0.041
0.250
TNFITA
0.255
0.136
0.219
0.076

Reprinted from James A. Gentry, Paul Newbold, and David T. Whitford,
"Predicting Bankruptcy:
If Cash Flow' s Not the Bottcrn Line, What Is?
Financial Analysts Journal, September-October 1985.

The authors analyzed these rreans and standard deviations and created a
model like Al bnan' s, that weighted each of the flows.

Unlike Altman's

model, however, each flow weight is changed when looking at a different
period in time prior to bankruptcy.

For example,

the dividend flow

weight changes from 13 .133 one year prior to failure to 17. 691 three

35
years prior to failure .13
bankruptcy model,

Al though this feature complicates the

it increases the reliability of the prediction for

greater periods of time prior to the event.
The funds flow model of bankruptcy prediction resulted in greater
abi 1 i ty to di scr i mi na te between bankrupt and non-bankrupt com:p3nies
earlier in time.

This model represents an improvement over Altman' s,

that is, from a reliability point of view, but it is not without its
faults.

It continues to share one major drawback with Altman' s

formula:

the use of accounting data.

Z

Again the reliability of the model

is effected by the accuracy and methodology of the accounting system a
firm uses.

Another problem with funds flow is its complexity.

Even in

their article, the authors did little to explain the mechanics of the
model, or how they generated the weighting syste.~ they used on the funds
components.

This aspect will no doubt delay its acceptance by investor

and credit managers.

The authors themselves admit that this analysis is

only slightly more reliable than Altman's.
two methods will probably yield

They suggest a combination of

the best estimate of a

firm's

mortality .14

MARKET INDICATOR METHOD OF PREDICTION
Given the disadvantages of using accounting data as a source of
information,
required.

other sources of reliable bankruptcy indicators are

Queen and Roll have suggested the use of market based

Brbid. 53
14rbid. 54.
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information as a source of predictive data.15

They base their

assumptions on the theory that the behavior of the firm's securities on
the market should reflect all publicly available information about the
firm.

Known as the se~i-strong market hypothesis, it provides a way of

assessing the aggregate views of a firm's many investors.

Investors,

both individuals and corporations, have their own expectations of the
future.

In theory, these expactations should have a strong imP3ct on a

security's value to investors.

It is this idea upon which the model of

market indicator prediction is based.
Maggie Queen and Richard Roll have built their theory on market
After sorting through several years of market data,

data only.

the

authors selected five predictor variables most likely to impact the
prediction model.

The five variables are:

1.
Size of the firm, computed as the closing price
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding on the sa~e
date;
2.

Price, as given by the closing price;

3.
Total return, computed as the total return over a
perioj including reinvested distributions to shareholders,
such as dividends, and capital adjustments, such as
splits;
4. variance of return, calculated as the variance of the
daily returns; and
5. Beta, the relative volatility of the stock as compared
with a market index.16
The authors gathered their data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) •
15Maggie Queen and Richard Roll, "Firm Mortality: using Market Indicators
to Predict Survival," Financial Analysts Journal, May-June 1987, 9.
16Ibid. 11.
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Queen and Roll departed from the usual course of bankruptcy
prediction rrodels by adding to the range of possible outcomes for a firm
in a bankruptcy situation.

The authors considered the bankruptcy of a

business from the stockholder's point of view.
unfavorable to stockholders.
another, or be acquired.

Not all bankruptcies are

The firm may go private,

merge with

In these situations the stockholder may profit.

Thus Queen and Roll sought to classify market data predictors as
indicators of favorable mortality or unfavorable mortality, not just
whether a firm would survive or not.
considered favorable mortality.
merged.

If a firm stayed healthy it was

Likewise, if the firm was acquired or

Only in those situations where the business was delisted by the

exchange or liquidated was the mortality considered unfavorable.17
The authors divided their sample of N securities into ten groups
based on the value of each of the, five market variables.
these ten groups under each variable,
mortality rate was calculated.

For each of

a favorable and unfavorable

This mortality rate was the amount of

firms in the sample group that failed in every year after the base year
of 1962.

It was clear,

unfavorable mortality.
ceased to exist after

in their work, that size is correlated with
Approximately 25% of the smallest firms have
ten years,

while

the

largest rarely have

unfavorable mortality.
The overall results of this study have shown that size and
variance of return are the most reliable predictors of bankruptcy.
Surprisingly, beta turned out to be a poor discriminator of bankruptcy
destined businesses, indicating that the estimate of systematic risk of a
17Ibid. 17.
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firm reveals little information about its survival potential.

The

authors did find out that market price and return were marginally
effective predictors, but they were subject to distortion caused by the
announcement effect the firms themselves produced.

This announcement

effect is caused by the firm announcing changes, either favorable or
unfavorable, which causes a change in the market price and return of the
company's securities
consumnated .18

in

the period prior

to when

the

event

is

In this way the firm has essentially made the rnortali ty

decision early, prior to the actual event,

and

its securities will

reflect this.
Queen and Roll never combined these figures into one equation as
the other methods did.

They considered each separately and assigned the

probabilities of bankruptcy to each group.

Thus if you know what decile

group your firm falls into for each of the factors you can arrive at a
general estimate of how many firms in your group will survive X number of
years.

The big drawback of this is the shear bulk of the calculations

involved to arrive with a prediction.

Remember the entire market must be

considered and divided up based on figures which change daily.
quite a job, and very likely impossible without a computer.
this method provides

reliable

results,

its

This is

Even though

costs may make

it

prohibitively expensive for investors.

BOND RAT!~ INDICATORS
The bond market itself provides indicators of bankruptcy in firms.
Financial services assign quality ratings to bonds that measure the
default

( bankruptcy)

l81bid. 14.

risk and then sell these ratings to the rated
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co:npanies.

Ratings classification begins with AA'A. bonds,

the highest

quality oonds, and conclude with D bonds, indicating the company is in
default of its loans.

These quality ratings are determined by two

factors: 19

1. The amount of funds available to the issuer relative
to the a'110unt of funds required by contract to be paid to
bondholders; and
2.

the strength of the security owner's claim for payment

In essena:,

the financial

w.

bankruptcy.

B.

services are computing a probability of

Hickman, a financial analyst,

bonds between 1920 and 1940.20

studied hundreds of

He cornpi led Table 3 below which

illustrates the correlation between bond quality and the percentage of
finns going bankrupt.
Table 3.
defculls and bond ratings
period

A.AA

AA

A

BBB

1920-1929
1930-1939
1920-1939

.12%
.42%
.30%

.17%
.44%
.30%

.20%
1.94%
1.1%

.80%
3.78%
2.3%

Source: W. B. Hickmon, Corporate Bond Quo/it,, ond Investor Experience (Notional Bureau of Economic
Research, Washington, O.C., 1958).

Additionally, it is possible to see how a firm descends down into
bankruptcy by the manner in which its b:>nd ratings deteriorate over tirre.
Table 4 depicts the decline of the
bankruptcy.

York:

w.

T. Grant Company prior to its

Although oond ratings the:nselves give no exact probability

19Jack Clark Francis, Investments: Analysis and Management, 4th ~d., (New
McGraw-Hill Book Canpany, 1986), 215.
20Ibid.
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of a firm going into bankruptcy, they provide clear warnings of a firm's
failure.

Table 4.
the W. T. Grant bankruptcy

date

Standard &. Poor's
bond rating

Jan. 1973
Feb. 1973
Mor. 1973
Apr. 1973
May 1973
June 1973
July 1973
Aug. 1973
Sept. 1973
Oct. 1973
Nov. 1973
Dec. 1973
Jon. 1974
Feb. 1974
Mar. 1974
Apr. 1974
May 1974
June 1974
July 1974
Aug. 1974
Sept. 1974
Oct. 1974
Nov. 1974
Dec. 1974
Jan. 1975
Feb. 1975
Mor. 1975
Apr. 1975
Moy 1975
June 1975
July 1975
Aug. 1975
_Sept. 1975
Oct. 1975

BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
.BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BB
BB
BB
BB
BB
BB
BB
B
B
B
B
B
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC
CCC

cc
C

bonds' price
per $100 of
face value

bonds' yield
to maturity

common
stock
price

$80.125
79.00
78.15
76.875
77.75
78.00
69.875
65.125
70.00
74.125
75.375
65.00

6.88%
7.15%
7.27%
7.44%
7.37%
7.34%
8.57%
9.39%
8.58%
7.95%
7.78%
9.49%

$39.00
31.50
27.375
22.375
17.25
17.375
19.00
18.75
21.25
18.75
12.50
10.875

65.00
64.00
61.00
61.125
·51.00
51.00
50.875
30.00
28.125
31.125
28.25
23.00

9.51%
9.70%
10.31%
10.32%
12.62%
12.65%
12.72%
20.57%
21.48%
2Q.07%
21.77%
25.67%

11.375
9.00
7.625
7.25
6.625
5.25
4.625
3.25
3.00
2.625
2.50
1.875

28.00
27.125
32.50
31.50
35.00
41.00
39.00
36.00
25.00
15.00

22.07%
22.71%
19.67%
20.26%
18.61%
16.23%
17.05%
18.36%
24.50%
bankruptcy declared

2.375
3.375
5.00
4.875
4.125
4.125
4.00
3.50
2.89

quarterly
earnings
per share

quarterly
cash
dividend

2.70

$.375

2.40

.375

2.41

.375

1.90

.375

.59

.15

.50

.15

.08

0

(.47)*

0

(.47)*

0

(15.71)*

0

(19.06)*

0

$

• Parentheses signify losses.

Source: Standard &. Poo(s Bond Guide. published monthly 1973-1975: ISL Doi/,' Stock Price Manuals.

Reprinted from Jack Clark Francis, Investments: Ai.,al ysis and Management,
4th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Canpany, 1986)
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SUBJECTIVE SIGNAI.S OF BANKRUPTCY
The preceding quantitative methods have shown some utility in the
prediction of corporate bankruptcy, yet these are not the only methods
available to financial analysts.

It is possible that companies send out

other signals of corporate heal th which have not yet become a part of
market or accounting data.
with potentially fatal

Daniel C. Cohn has suggested that co:npanies

financial diseases exhibit early warning signs

just as someone with heart disease does.21

He says these early warning

signs are frequently ignored until it is too late.
Six symptoms of the approach of business failure are considered.22
1.
The business is required to expand sales.
This
usually indicates that costs are out of control. If sales
must go up to rreet the firm's financial goals, then the
firm may be dealing with decreased productivity,
disproportionate overhead or a weak product.
This
increase in volume may not solve its problans.
2.
Scrambling to meet payroll and other expenses. This
can show that a firm is living too close to the line, and
liquidity problems are right around the corner. Cash flow
manage.nent is essential for solvency.
An analysis and
comparison of the firm's credit policies can reveal signs
of impending doom.
3.
Late payment of taxes.
This is a sure sign of the
liquidity proble:ns noted above.
It is te11pting for the
management to dip into the fund reserved for taxes and
never pay it back.
The underlying proble:n that caused
managernent to use the fund will probably not go away, and
trouble is sure to develope.
4.
Owners putting rrcre and more equity into their firms
is also a sign of financial distress. This is a sign that
the financial sources available are beginning to dry up.
Generally it is an ominous sign.

21Daniel c. Cohn, "Financial Disaster:
The Practical Accountant, Novem:er 1985, 79.
22Ibid.

The Symptoms and the Re-nedies,"
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5.
If the bank tightens credit or tegins to insist on
security for its loans then this is a hint that something
has become rrore risky about the company.
The investor
should use caution when this starts to happen.
6.
When the business is constantly facing a series of
crises, this is an omen of faulty management policies.
Even if these crises are not directly related to finance
it is only a matter of time before they spill over.
7.
One rrore aspect to look at is the senior management
and the owners themselves.
oo they look haggard,
overworked, or are they starting to bail out of the firm?
Is management or the owners plagued by depression and
sleeplessness? If they are, it may be a sign of internal
problans not yet visible in the financial data of the
business.
These subjective measures are not readily visible to the average
investor, although financial publications such as the Wall Street Journal
report about such concerns daily.

The measures do, however, highlight

the importance of doing a fundamental analysis of a firm's management
when considering whether a firm is a candidate for bankruptcy.

External

factors may cause problem for a business, but management is ultimately
responsible for the denise of the co~pany.

An assessment must be made of

their capacity to run the business efficiently and to handle changes and
adversity in the environment.

Sillft1ARY

This chapter examined the tools currently available to predict
bankruptcy.

Accounting rrethods were fairly easy and inexpensive to use

and provided fairly reliable data.

The accuracy of this method tended to

deteriorate rapidly if used to look rrore than 2 or 3 years into the
future.

Accounting data methods were also shown to be subject to

distortions created by differing accounting systems and periods.

In an
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atte:npt to correct these problems, market based indicators were then
This method provided the most accurate assessment of

considered.

bankruptcy prediction.

It was, however, expensive and canplex, and very

likely beyond the reach of most investors.

Finally, subjective

indicators leading to the demise of a firm were considered.

This method

demonstrated imr:crtant aspects of the firm's management to be considered
when ca-npiling a bankruptcy prediction.

Although difficult to observe

for the average investor these subjective aspects of the firm and
particularly the management must be considered.
In conclusion, it is certain that many metho~s for predicting
bankruptcy exist.
drawbacks.

Each of these have its own strong points and

It becomes clear, however, that no one method is certain to

predict bankruptcy with canplete accuracy, and no one method can replace
a careful fundamental analysis of the firm's management and operations.
The investor must stay alert to each signal broadcast by a firm to assess
its p:)tential.

CHAPTER 4
STCXl<HOLDER OPTIONS BEFORE BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCI'ION

The perilous nature of the free market demands constant vigilance
on the part of the stockholder.

However, even the vigilant stockholder

may wind up holding equity in a failing firm.
the shareholder's firm may fail.
assets.

There are many reasons why

Unexpected acts of nature can destroy

Unpredicted changes in the financial or marketing environment

may deal a serious blow to the company's operations.

Most likely though,

the corporation's manage~ent has made an error of judgement, moving the
business into troubled times.
options.

In this situation the firm still has many

Stockholders must know r,.;hat prudent courses of action exist for

the firm so they can judge the correctness of managanent's actions prior
to b3nkruptcy.

Figure B. on the next ~ge diagrams alternative actions

available to failing firms.

Clearly, given the previously discussed

bankruptcy laws, some alternatives are not in the best interests for
stockholders.

A business on the verge of failure has two basic options

available; these are:

1. Out of court agreements;

consolidation into another firm.

and

2. Merger or

This chapter will describe means

businesses can use to avoid tankruptcy, and how stockholders should
interpret these means.
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Figure B.

Alternative Remedies when Firms Fail

Extension-pay later
Firm continues
Out or court
procedures

Firm is
unable to
meet its
. obligations

Merger into
another firm

[
--;.

{

- [

Composition-creditors agree to take less

Firm ceases 10 cxisl-Common /aw assignment-assignee liquidales asscls
and distributes proceeds on a pro-rata basis

Identity continued as a subsidiary ·

Absorbed into other operations

Firm continues-- Chapter 11 Rcorgnnizntion-More formal, court supervised
composition or modification
of claims
Formal legal
proceedings

~
Statutory assignment-Assignee liquidates assets under
·
formal legal procedures
Firm ceases to exist
- {

Liquidation under Chapter 7-More formal bankruptcy
court supervised
liquidation

Reprinted from J. Fred Weston and Thomas E. Copeland, Managerial Finance,
8th ed., (Chicago: The Dryden Press, 1986)
+'
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OOT OF COURI' SETTLEMENTS
There are many reasons why a business would choose to keep its
affairs out of court.

The biqgest reason is exp?nse.

As stated earlier,

court costs, attorney fees, and other administrative expenses can soar
during lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.

To illustrate these costs,

Manville Corp. has reportedly paid as much in professional fees for its
bankruptcy as it had paid in defending over 16,000 lawsuits against it.l
Cost is not the only reason to avoid bankruptcy.
firms fear

the dilution of their power

The managenent of many

in bankruptcy.

Although

bankruptcy courts in most instances allow the firm to continue under its
previous management,
business.

the court now has a say in what goes on in the

In this way the firm's directors loose control their company's

destiny.

Management I s

ability to do long range planning is almost

impossible in Chapter 11.

Finally, the stigma of bankruptcy alone may be

incentive enough to avoid it.

Co:npanies operating under Chapter 11

encounter problans associated with its stigma.

The loss of confidence in

the firm's products and the firm's ability to reimburse its suppliers are
among its chief proble:ns.
Business rranagers may decide that these disadvantages associated
with bankruptcy outv-1eigh the advantages of court protection.
is unable to meet its obligations,
alternative.

If the fir:n

an out of court settlement is an

This depends primarily upon the creditors of the firm.

Creditors must be willing to help the debtor firm through its dilem11a.
The task for the company itself is to convince its creditors that it is

lsteven A. Meyerowitz, "Bankruptcy:
Business Marketing, November 1985, 92.

The Strategic Wild Card,"

....,.

..
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to their advantage to keep the firm out of bankruptcy courts.

According

to Weston and Copland, three conditions are necessary to make an out of
court settlement feasible:
1. The debtor must be a good m:>ral risk, seeking to honor
its agreements and obligations.
2.

The firm must show the ability to recover.

3. General business conditions must favor the recovery of
the firrn.2
Credi tors must be convinced by the firm that these conditions are rret.
In essence, the firm is asking for more credit.

If granted, this credit

will be in the form of an extension or a composition.

EXTENSION AND COMPOSITION

Extension and composition are voluntary concessions by creditors
to the debtor f irrn.

They rewrite the original contract made between

debtor and creditor.

Extension is literally the extension of credit

beyond its due date; and agreement for later payment of the full amount.
Composition addresses the amount of repayment.

The creditor will agree

to take only a fraction of the original debt in full satisfaction of the
claim.

Clearly, the creditor stands to loose in both forms of repayment.

The net present value of the creditor's claim is reduced in an extension.
Composition results in only partial payment of the debt.

Creditors

settle for these renegotiated claims because they simply have no choice.
The alternative of filing for involuntary bankruptcy would result in even
less of the claim being paid.

The key is for the debtor f irrn to

2weston, Managerial Finance, 956.
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successfully convince its creditors that it is to their advantage to
negotiate out of court.
There are advantages in this form of voluntary settlement for
corporate stockholders.
expenses,
operations.
Secondly,

First of all, the firm saves considerable legal

leaving more capital

for

debt servicing

and

This alone can serve to reduce the risk of

business
the firm.

the stockholders avoid the negative stigma associated with

Chapter 11 reorganizations.
price of a firm's stock.

This stigma typically effects the market
Clark and Weinstein

[1983]

reported

in an

analysis of distressed firms that stock prices decreased substantially
when com1?3nies _filed for b3nkruptcy.3

This decrease was in addition to

the already depressed price of the stock due to market awareness of the
firm's failing health.

Finally, the firm's management is left in tact.

Although this may be a disadvantage, particularly if management is
responsible for the firm's woes, the people in control of the company
should be most familiar with the co:npany' s problems and how to solve
them.
The disadvantage of voluntary settlements become evident when a
small faction of creditors prefer to take an adversary role.
creditors can beco:ne a nuisance, making negotiations difficult.

Such
weston

and Copeland point out that small creditors are likely to assume this
role, forcing the debtor firm to pay off each debt with a base amount and
an agreed upon percentage of the balance.4

Additionally, the debtor firm

3victor Pastena, and William Ruland.
"The Merger/Bankruptcy
Alternative," The Accounting Review, April 1986, 291.
4weston, 957.
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should use optimUt"U care and judge."Tient when renegotiating its contracts.
It is possible for management to obligate themselves in ways they may
regret later.
Gibbs.5

An example of this occurred with the finn of Willcox and

This company's creditors forced on it a provision that would

give then a share of future profits.

This provision becarre expensive

when the company was successfully turned around.

Willcox and Gibbs, Co.

finally bought their way out of it for $2.4 million in cash and $2.8
million in notes.6

THE MERGER ALTERNATIVE
Restructuring the firm may be the only way to ensure corporate
survival.

This restructuring is in essence a form of defensive posturing

by the corporation against a hostile environment.

A failing firm unable

to get concessions from its creditors must find additional capital.
There are two methods whereby a firm in financial despair can raise this
capital:

merger or divestiture.
'

The debtor firm seeks to sell itself in a merger.

The company

depends on another firm, usually larger, to buy it via a tender offer.
Typically,

the buying firm approaches the board of directors of the

target firm and announces their intentions.

A firm near bankruptcy,

however, may go out of its way to advertise that it is available for
acquisition.
debtor

firm.

The tender offer is then made to the stockholders of the
The

intent of the acquiring firm is

controlling interest in the target company.

to purchase a

Once the debtor firm is

5Gary Slutsker, "The Joys of Bankruptcy," Forbes, 28 July 1986, 136.
6rbid.
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acquired, it ceases to exist as its original entity.

It can be absorbed

complete 1 y into the other corporation, fused with the other firm to
create and entirely new company,
autonomous subsidiary of
managanent,

or

it could be kept as a

the acquiring firm.

fairly

It is possible that

in fear of their jobs, may opfOse the merger.

In this

instance, the firm wishing to acquire the target business rray approach
the target's stockholders directly.

This is known as a hostile takeover.

Due to the failing company's size or other factors,
co:-npanies may not be able to purchase the entire firm.

other

On the other

hand, the debtor may only want to sell its unprofitable divisions, not
the entire canpany.
divestiture.

The solution for both buyers and sellers

is a

A divestiture involves the sale of just a portion of the

firm to an outside buyer.
capital from the sale.
into the buying firm.

The divesting co:-npany receives badly needed

The divested portion of the company is absorbed
Closely related to this is an equity carve out.

This is where equity in a portion of the firm is sold to outsiders.
Thus, instead of selling a piece of the 'canpany to another firm already
in existence, the portion is sold to new stockholders, and an entirely
new firm is created.7
It has been argued that stockholders in the failing corporation
would prefer a merger or divestiture to bankruptcy.

Victor Pastena and

Willia~ Ruland in a 1986 study on bankruptcy, point out that stockholders
have much to gain in a merger.
mergers over bankruptcy:

7weston, 708.

They note the following advantages of

·~
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1.
Avoidance of bankruptcy's legal and ad'l'linistrati ve
costs.

2. Possible loss of tax carryforwards of a bankrupt firm
on liquidation.
3. Going concern value in a merger is greater than the
liquidation value if the bankruptcy progresses to
liquidation.

4.

Adverse effects of bankruptcy on sales and income due
to customer fears of inability to honor contracts.8

Shareholders wi 11 continue to hold stock of sorre positive value as a
result of a merger.

The authors report, however, that the stock value

declined to zero in 66 out of 162 l:ankrupt finns studies.9
The stooy by Pastena and Ruland further points out that

the

interests of stockholders and managers diverge on the issue of bankruptcy
EVen though stockholders tend to gain in a merge for the

or merger.

above reasons, managers may feel their best interests are served by
bankruptcy.10

In a study supported by Jensen and Ruback

[ 1983]

they

report that "since target managers replaced after takeovers lose p::>wer,
}

prestige, and the value of organization-specific human capital, they have
incentives to oppose a

takeover bid even though shareholders might

benefit substantially from acquisition.11
especially vigilant on this point.

Stockholders need to be

The takeover offer must be carefully

considered· in the light of management's abilities to turn a bankrupt firm
around.

As

indicated by several studies,

8pastena, 289.
9Ibid.
10 Ibid. 290.
llibid.

the odds are against
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management.

This would indicate few managers have what it takes to bring

a firm out of bankruptcy successfully.

THE BANKRUPTCY DOCISION
It is clear that stockholder stand to lose much in bankruptcy.

If

out of court settlements fail and the company cannot find a suitable
merger partner, bankruptcy is irrminent.

The stcx::kholder has now reached

a point where he must make the decision to take what is left of his
investment and leave,

or stick out bankruptcy with the firm.

This

decision will weigh heavily on management• s actions up to this time.
First of all, management must convince shareholders they have the skills
to operate

in an austere business climate.

Together with this,

management should be working to establish credibility and goodwill.
the management of a company does

What

to alleviate apprehension a-nong

investors is seen by analysts as one of the best tests of management's
true colors.12
One way to boost shareholder confidence is to set up an investor
relations program.13
uncertainty by

This program can help eliminate stockholder

providing

reorganization

information

to

them.

Stockholders will want to know specifically how much debt the firm has,
and how management intends to pay it off.

If management sea-ns to be

secretive about these matters or infers that creditors will be paid with
equity, it would behoove the stcx::kholder to get out before bankruptcy is
12oebbie Galant,
Novenber 1986, 217.
131bid. 218.

"When the Truth Hurts," Institutional Investor,
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declared.

This way some money is salvaged since the stocks of a bankrupt

firms typically drop 30 to 50 f?=rcent within two days after bankruptcy is
declared.14

In addition, paying creditors with equity will dilute the

firm's stock, another serious loss for shareholders.
Stockholder must look at other aspects of the failing company.
the co:npany likely to get support from the federal goverrment?

Is
The

government wi 11 support firms having an impact on national security.
They will also support finns to prevent an erosion of confidence in
financial ins ti tut ions, to maintain a valuable supplier, and to avoid
disrupting a local comnunity.15

Chrysler Motor Co. and [X)uglas Aircraft

Co. are the best examples of this.

S~Y

There is much for stockholders of a dying firm to consider before
bankruf)tcy is declared.

If possible, out of court settlements offer

advantages to both the debtor and creditors.

Mergers and divestitures

offer alternative means of financing for"insolvent firms.

Each of these

methods is a double edged sword for the stockholder, offering advantages
and drawbacks.

Owners of equity should examine the actions of manage~ent

in this troubled period.

This will tell stockholders if they can rely on

management during reorganization.

The next chapter wi 11 discuss

important attributes of the canpany and management needed to successfully
reorganize the firm.

Shareholder options during the course of the

reorganization will be examined.
14Kenneth L. Fisher,
15weston, 953.

11

Bankruptcy Bargains," Forbes, 20 May 1985, 92.

CHAPTER 5

STOCKHOWER OPTIONS DUR!~ BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Once bankruptcy is declared by a firm, the stockholder can either
take his loss or comni t

to the rehabilitation of the business.

The

Investor's stock is usually at its most depressed state at this time:
just short of becoming worthless.

It is important for stockholders to

remember in these dark time that investment considerations applicable to
normal businesses pertain to bankruptcies just as well.

The depressed

nature of the firm's stock may present opportunities for profits.

The

key is for the shareholders to consider the capital structure of the
company and the abilities of its managers.
have assets of considerable value.

A bankrupt company may still

In addition, certain IIBnagers IIBY

possess extraordinary skill in getting . the company back on its feet.
These are the things to watch for.

Certainly the stockholder has little

to lose at this point in tirre.

DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE SURVIVAL
The true value of a bankrupt firm may not be represented by the
price of its securities.
bankruptcy's stigma,

Given the previously mentioned effects of

the firm's securities will probably be depressed

below an objective valuation of the company.

The fact is that about one-

third of all bankrupt firms wi 11 successfully reorganize
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into a
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profitable company .1

What investors fail to consider are the factors

effecting the company's reorganization potential.
Although many studies have been done on the subject of predicting
bankruptcy, surprisingly little has been written on the likelihood of
corporate survival once in bankruptcy.

In addition, the Report of the

Corrmission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States [U.S. Congress,
1973]

found little evidence that the bankruptcy courts themselves had

studied the survival prospects of the firms petitioning for bankruptcy
reorganization.2

The three studies that have been done on the subject;

Hong in 1983, LoPucki in 1983, and White in 1984, have found consistent
characteristics of successfully reorganized firms.
The studies indicated the following attributes of firms that will
successfully reorganize:
1. Have more free assets. Free assets, those not secured
by previous borrowing, are available as collateral for
additional borrowing. The greater the proportion of free
assets, the more likely the firm can obtain additional
financing needed to emerge successfully from bankruptcy
proceedings.
2.
Are larger.
Larger firms are more likely to have
raised capital in the past by issuing long-term, unsecured
bonds.
The assets generated by such borrowing are
available to serve as collateral for additional borrowing.
3.
Have more attractive earnings prospects.
Firms
expected to operate profitably in the near future should
be able to generate funds internally or obtain funds from
external borrowing in order to emerge successfully from
bankruptcy proceedings.

lcornelius J. Casey, Victor E. McGee, and· Clyde P. Stickney,
"Discriminating Between Reorganized and Liquidated Firms in Bankruptcy,"
The Accounting Review, April 1986, 250.
2rbid.
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4. Have strong equity comnitments by management. Owners'
equity claims are generally eliminated in liquidation.
This fact gives managers acting as agents of the owners a
strong incentive to prefer reorganization to liquidation.
The larger the potential loss to management, the greater
the incentive to reorganize rather than liquidate.3
The above factors were all found to be statistically significant in
White's model.

This model, using these factors, correctly identified

those firms successfully reorganizing more than seventy percent of the
time.4

MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL REORGANIZATION
Management ultimately controls
successful reorganization.

the factor

that

lead to a

They control the factors listed above along

with others that set up the firm to be a winner during the course of its
bankruptcy.

Management's job during this time is to steer the canpany

away from failure.

They must realistically appraise the situation and

take sound actions.

According to John A. Miller and Terence W. Newlin,

management

consultants

reorganizations,

in

a

firf(l

specializing

in

business

there are five major areas where management should

concentrate its efforts to TIBke the turn around of the business work:
making operations profitable;

developing a project team approach;

managing the existing business; preparing for creditor negotiations; and
seeking new sources of cash.5
3rbid, 252.
4rbid, 257.
5John A. Miller and Terence W. Newlin, "Managing a Successful
Chapter 11 Reorganization," Management Review, April 1986. 36.
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The company must find .some way to make a profit if it
survive.
divisions.

Hopefully,

is to

the company can just sell off its unprofitable

If they cannot, managers will have to take cost cutting

measures, no matter how unpopular these are.
at this point.

Many firms fall into a trap

A company may be losing on each i tern of product

manufactured, and sold.

Management, failing to understand this aspect of

cost accounting, tries to increase sales.

The loss of revenue increased

by further marketing efforts and product price reductions needed to sell
off inventories, will exacerbate the firm's cash flow problans and hasten
its death.

Management must take immediate trouble shooting actions to

find out exactly what is wrong with the canpany and determine if they
have the means to alleviate the problem.

Experts in cost accounting,

marketing, and other areas should be consulted if necessary.
decision can help management in two ways.

An early

It helps prevent further

damage to the company's financial structure, increasing the corporation's
value to stockholders and creditors.

Secondly,

it demonstrates

manage:nent' s ability to control the firm,

increasing the like 1 i hood

management will retain control in reorganization.
Reorganization is a difficult and trying time for management.
Managers must continue their day-to-day duties running the firm while
trying to handle the new demands imposed by reorganization.

Since these

demands often exceed managers' capabilities, a dedicated team to handle
the reorganization effort is required.
of qualified

inside managers supplemented by outside professional

guidance and perspective.6
6rbid, 37.

This project team should consist

The inside managers should be most familiar
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with the problems of the company.

Carefully selected outside

professionals experienced with the legal, operational, financial, and
planning aspects of business reorganizations, can assist managers in
working out the details of the reorganization.

The team approach can be

used to instill trust and confidence in investors and creditors.
While the project team works on the specific details of
reorganization, managers at every level in the company need maintain
their control of the firm's operation.
faith in the company will be eroded.
the company in many ways.
in other firms.

This will be difficult because

This decline in faith will effect

First, employees will begin looking for work

This will be especially true of the more talented

personnel. The people the company needs most.

In addition, the employee

loss rate wi 11 be exacerbated if employees are laid off without any
severance plan by the firm.7

The firm should consider an incentive plan

to keep its key people in the fold.

Secondly, once routine business

transactions will be complicated by the fact that suppliers will demand
cash for materials and services.

Cash payments can help the firm if it

can generate sufficient cash flow to allow it.

Cash payments wi 11

increase supplier confidence, reduce the cost of purchased itens, and
keep the company's debt to a minimum.

Managers will have to deal with

these new aspects of their jobs in order for the firm to be successful.
If the business can be made profitable again, and managers are
doing their jobs, then the fate of the firm will rest with its creditors.
The payment plan worked out by the corporation and its creditors can make
or break the firm's recovery.
7Ibid, 38.

Thus, the firm

must prepare a sensible
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repayment plan before negotiations are started with creditors.

The best

way to prepare a repayment plan is to begin with a realistic valuation of
the firm.

This valuation will give creditors an idea of the liquidation

value of the company.

Next, the firm's cash flow must be considered.

Management must determine both the expected and required cash flows based
on its business forecasts.

They must take into account cash flow from

operations, any capital infusion from investors, and money obtained from
the sale of corporate assets.

Given these results, rranagement can now

determine how much the company can pay its creditors without undermining
its operations.

Company officials should be honest and open in their

dealings with creditors.

It is the firm's goal to prove to creditors

that the company is worth rrore to them heal thy than liquidated, and
management's payback plan is the best way to ensure corporate health.
The importance of cash flow to the recovering firm cannot be
understated.

Cash generated from operations is vital and necessary to

reach agreements with creditors.8
from all available sources.

The corporate managers must seek cash

Cash is available from banks,

capitalists, private investors, and even creditors.

venture

The firm should

contact all these sources, emphasizing the protection offered by Chapter
11 to new investors,

the firm's reorganization potential, and its

goodwill.

INVESTitiG IN BANKRUPT COMPANIES

Investment considerations in bankrupt companies are not much
different from any other type of investment.
8Ibid, 39.

Stockholders still need to
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do a fundamental analysis of the firm's management and corporate
operations.

However, there are additional factors shareholders need to

consider when dealing with bankrupt firms.

These factors are:

the risk

of the investment; and the timing of the investment.

INVESTMENT RISK IN BANKRUPT COMPANIES

Investments in the distressed market are not for the risk adverse
investor.

The reason for this is the uncertainty of dealing with a

bankrupt firm.

First, as mentioned earlier, only about one-third of all

bankrupt firms successfully reorganize.
those odds.

Additionally, the company's operations are now tied to the

bankruptcy court.
resolved.

Many investors cannot tolerate

Legal issues will take a great deal of time to be

It is important to note that since lawyers are paid by the

hour, it is to their advantage to drag out the proceedings as long as
possible.

During this time the corporation's stock will become dormant

as investors adopt a "lets wait and see" attitude.
The astute investor should look for those qualities in the firm
that reduce the risk of the investment.
lower risk even in a bankrupt company.

A good cash flow indicates
Additionally, a company with

productive assets stands a better chance of surviving bankruptcy.
Diversified firms with several divisions are lower risk because the
company can always sell its unprofitable components when times get hard.
Shareholders thenselves can reduce the risk of bankruptcy investments
through diversification, buying the stock of several different bankrupt
firms.

Finally, mutual funds specializing in bankrupt companies, such as
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the Merrill Lynch Phoenix Fund, are available to investors unwilling to
put in the extra time studying their investments.9

TIMI~ OF BANKRUPTCY INVESTMENTS

Timing is critical when investing in the stock of a bankrupt firm.
Many investors buy stock before the firm goes bankrupt.
wait until after it does.

The key is to

The reason for this is that the price of a

corporation's stock will drop dramatically when the company files for
bankruptcy.

On

the average the company's stock loses about 40 percent of

its value in the first few days of bankruptcy.10

It does so because of

bankruptcy's stigma, even though bankruptcy was indicated by the state of
the firm's health months before it actually filed.

Typically the firm's

stock will level off and become dormant after a few weeks, although it
may drift lower at year-end as individuals take tax losses.11

The first

year after bankruptcy is filed wi 11 tell much about the future of the
firm.

If the company is to be liquidated its stock wi 11 drift slowly

lower in price until it beccrnes worthle'ss.

If the canpany has a good

chance for recovery its stock will begin to climb within a few months of
filing.

Even during recovery however, the price of the firm's stock will

be depressed because many investors undervalue bankrupt firms.12

This is

9oonald H. Dunn, "When to Invest in a Battered Stock," Business
Week, 22 June 1987, 162.
10Eugene Linden, "The Big Money In Busted Bonds," Fortune, 15
February 1988, 101.
llKenneth L. Fisher, "Bankruptcy Bargains," Forbes, 20 May 1985, 25.
12George Lange, "Bankrupt Companies are Suddenly a Chic Invesbnent,"
Business Week, 1 October 1984, 92.

62

where the keen investor can make his profit.

The investor can accurately

determine whether the firm is undervalued or not by using the above
methods to value the firm and determine its probability of recovery.

SUMMARY

The shareholder's valuation considerations for bankrupt firms are
essentially the same as other businesses.

The only difference is that

the management, financial structure, and operations of bankrupt firms
must be analyzed in light of their ability to successfully reorganize.
Firms that survive bankruptcy have common characteristics which help them
to reorganize.

Many of these characteristics are under the control of

management whose role in the reorganization is critical to its success.
Stockholders who choose to ride out the storm of bankruptcy may decide to
invest further in the canpany.

The risks are great, but careful analysis

can help reduce the risk and create a profitable investment.

~
I

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The stockholder has many options before and during bankruptcy.

In

order to understand what these options are, shareholders need to be aware
of the m:tny factors influencing corporate bankruptcies.

The bankruptcy

laws themselves can give the investor the best idea of their status in a
bankruptcy proceeding.

The difficulty with these laws, however, is that

they are constantly in flux, changing in interpretation and application.
A stockholder must be willing to keep abreast of the new developments in
this area.

If the stockholder chooses to avoid the bankruptcy issue,

they need to know some of the warning signs associated with failing
firms.

This is the key to avoiding the stock of troubled c<xnpanies.

Through neglect or by choice, the equity holder may decide to stick with
his invesbnent up to the eve of the bankruptcy.

Management's actions

during this time will be the best irydication of the future of the
canpany.

The shareholder should note management's actions to prepare the

firm for reorganization, merger, or dissolution.
ability to turn the canpany around.

This will hint at their

Finally, stockholders that decide to

maintain their investment in a bankrupt firm need to consider the factors
that help a firm succeed in bankruptcy.

The strength of

the

corporation's financial picture and the reorganization abilities of
management need to be investigated.

If the firm turns out to have a

strong potential for greater earnings,
shareholder is prudent.
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further investment by the
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The following conclusions are based on the information supplied in
this paper.
bankruptcy.

The stockholder is in a precarious position during
This is due to the nature of the bankruptcy laws themselves.

It is to the shareholder's advantage to avoid the issue by staying away
from marginal firms.

Stockholders who prefer more risk may find some of

their investments with companies in or near bankruptcy.

The shareholder

should carefully consider the financial structure of the canpany along
with the talents of its management when making the decision to pull out
or to stay in.
investments.

This fundamental analysis

is essential for all

This is especially true for failing companies.

The

conscientious and vigilant investor can turn a profit even in bankruptcy
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